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RECENT CASES.
CARRIERS-COMPETITION-INTERSTATB COMMERCE ACT-LONG AND SHORT
HAuL CLAUsE-LouISVILLE & NASHVILLE R. R. V. HENRY W BEHLUER, 20 Sup.
Court (Oct. term) 20g.-Held, that where carriers are subject to the Act to
Regulate Commerce, that competition which is material can be taken into con-
sideration for the purpose of determining the existence of a dissimilarity of cir-
cumstances and conditions within the meaning of P. 4 of the Act, although
that competition does not originate at the initial point of traffic.
The Circuit Court of Appeals decided that according to the Long and Short
Haul Clause in P. 4 (24 Stat. at L. 379), the plaintiff could not charge more for the
shorter haul than for the longer, as the competition did not originate at the
initial point of carriage This interpretation conformed with that of the
I. S. C. C., but the latter has since altered their view to the one taken by the
Supreme Court in I. S. C. C. v. Alabama M. R. Co., i68 U. S. 144: that if the
competition is material it does not matter whether it arises at the point of ship-
ment or point of delivery. And it is not necessary that the competition should
be of such a nature, that should one line not carry the goods between the two
points, the other competing line would do so.
CARRIERS-DUTY TO RECEIVE-FREIGHT TO BE CARRIED OVER CONNECTING
LINE-SEAsONGOOD ET AL. v. TENNEssEE & 0. TRANs. CO., 54 S. W. (Ky.) 193.-
Defendants, who ow.ed a boat which was accustomed to carry freight, refused
to carry goods of plaintiff, because they were for a point beyond their route.
Held, a carrier has no right to refuse to receive freight because it is destined
to a point beyond its own line. A contract by one carrier with another that it
will not receive goods destined to a point beyond its own line is illegal. Du
Relle, J., dissents.
The correctness of this decision is open to doubt; the court cites no
cases to uphold this doctrine, while in the case of The Atchison, Topieka
&- Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Denver &- New Orleans 1?. R. Co., iio U. 5. 667,
it is laid down most emphatically that: "At common law a common carrier is
not bound to take goods for a point beyond its own line." From this case it is
evident that the Kentucky doctrine is opposed to that laid down by the U. S.
Supreme Court.
CARRERs-FRIGHT-DEuiVERY-NOTIE TO CONSIGNEE-DIAMANT V. LONG
IsLAND R. Co., 62 N. Y. Sup. 5 9.- Defendant agreed by bill of lading to
transport merchandise and "tender it to the consignee." The bill also stated
that "carriage should be complete and charges earned," when merchandise
has been held a reasonable time without notice, subject to owner's order. The
goods were held, but no notice was given to consignee. Consignor sued for
value of goods. Held, that completion of the carriage did not dispense with
defendent's express obligation to tender; though notice would have been suf-
ficient to discharge him. Evidence of a custom dispensing with tender of de-
livery held inadmissible. MacLean, J., dissenting.
Carrier's liability as insurer when no notice is given is strictly held by the
New Hampshire rule, which is followed by thirteen States, Canada and Eng-
land. Moses v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 32 N. H. 523; Sherman v. Hudson ]. .
R. Co., 64 N. Y. 254. The Massachusetts rule is that carrier's liability ceases on
arrival and storage in a proper warehouse without notice, and carrier is then
liable as warehouseman. Eleven States follow this rule. 5 A. & Enc. 277
(2d. ed.); Norway Plains Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., i Gray (Mass.) 274;
othscild v. chgan Central, 69 Ill. 164.
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CHARITIES-SOCIETIES FOR THE PREVRNTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN-
PUBLIC CONTROL-PEoPLE EX RL. STATE BoARD OF CHARITIES V. NEW YORK
SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, 55 N. E. io63 (N. Y.).
-The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was incor-
porated for the enforcement of all lawful means necessary to that end. The
State Board of Charities, created for the purpose of visiting and inspecting all
charitable institutions within meaning of court, claimed the right to include
the New York society within its jurisdiction. Held, that Society for Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Children is organized for enforcement of criminal law, and
does not come under jurisdiction of State Board of Charities. Martin, Haight,
Vann, J. J., dissenting.
The practical value of this case lies in the distinction it makes between
charitable institutions in their true legal meaning and institutions which, in a
general sense, may be called charitable. An institution is not necessarily of
a charitable nature because it has the capacity to take and administer gifts,
nor can it be called charitable if incidentally it does something toward the alle-
viation of human misery and suffering. The term "Charitable Institution" can
be legally applied only to those institutions, public or private, that give public
pecuniary reief in that form commonly called "charity."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DISCRIMINATION IN FAVOR OF RESIDENT CREDITORS
-BLAKE ET AL. V. MCCLUNG ET AL., 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307.-A law giving
priority to resident creditors of a corporation doing business in a State, Held,
unconstitutional as depriving non-residents of the privileges and immunities
of citizens of a particular State, and also as a denial of the equal protection of
the law.
A mere compliance by the courts with the requirements of statutory
enactments is not due process of law, but the statutes themselves must affect
residents and non-residents alike. R. R Co. v. Baty, 6 'Nebr. 37; Taylor
v. Porter, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 14o.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-STATE FISHERIES AcT-EGLATION OF COMMRICE-
DUE PRocss OF LAw-PoLIcE POWER-PEOPLE v. BUFFALO FiSH Co., LTD., 62
N. Y., Sup. 543. Held, that Laws 1892, C. 488, . § 110, 112, making it a mis-
demeanor to catch, kill, or have in one's possession certain varieties of fish
during certain periods of the year, and imposing a penalty for its violation, so
far as they affect the possession and right of sale by a citizen of this State of
fish imported by him from a foreign country, on which a customs duty has
been paid, are in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate commerce,
and to such extent are void; that these laws making it a misdemeanor to have
in one's possession such varieties of fish during such periods, and imposing a
penalty for the violating, so far as they affect the possession and sale of fish
imported from without the State are unconstitutional, as depriving a person of
his property without due process of law; that such act cannot be upheld as a
lawful exercise of the police power of the State, on the ground of providing for
the propagation and preservation of game fish in the waters of the State.
Disapproving, Pels v. Racey, 6o N. Y. io.
The weight of authority seems to indicate that the States have the right
to make and enforce such laws. Magner v. Peofile, 97 Ill. 331; exparte
Maier, io3 Cal. 476, 42 Am. St. Rep. 129. State v. Saunders, 19 Kan. 127, 27
Am. Rep. 98, and Terrztory v. Evans, 2 Idaho 634, agree with the above
case. These State statutes are supported as being a valid exercise of the
police power in Roth v. State, 51 Ohio St. 29, 46 Am. St. Rep. s66. Thepos-
session of game lawfully taken and killed is held no crime in State v. Buck-
xam, 88 Me. 385, 5! Am. St. Rep. 406, and State v. Parker, 89 Me. Si.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE COMMERCE BY
QUARANTINE REGULATIONS-PARTIES-STATE OF LOUISIANA V. STATE OF TEXAS,
3o Sup. Ct., Rep. 25.-The State of Texas passed an act, under pretext of
a quarantine regulation, excluding all goods from the State coming from New
Orleans. In an action to test the validity of such act. Held, that the State of
Louisiana could not maintain the suit, not being a proper party. See Com-
ment.
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD-BURDEN OF PROOF-RosEVEAR V. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
62 N. Y. Supp. 447-Where an aged woman, mentally and physically weak,
grants her property to one in possession of all his faculties, held, that the
burden of proof that the transactions was fair is on the grantee, and if there
be failure in this, constructive fraud will be presumed. Green v. Roworth,
113 N. Y. 462.
Woodward, J., dissented on the ground that sanity and ability to transact
business are the ordinary conditions of grown men, and he who attacks the
ability of a grantor to execute a deed, must prove the lack of ability by a pre-
ponderance of evidence. /ones v. Jones, 137 N. Y. 61o. Where, as in this case,
there is no fiduciary relation, influence must be proved by extrinsic evidence.
Fisher v. Bishofi, 108 N. Y. 25.
CONTRACTS REQUIRING CLAIM FOR DAMAGES TO BE PRESENTED WITHIN CER-
TAIN TIME-DAvis v. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co., 54 S. W. 849 (Ky.).-In an action
to recover damages for failure to deliver a telegram, held, that the stipula-
tion in the contract for the transmission of the message requiringany claim for
damages to be presented in writing within 6o days after the message is filed,
is void as against public policy.
This decision is in accord with the rule laid down in Enbank et al. v.
Western Union Tel. Co. 38. S. W. xo68 (Ky.); Dryling v. The N. Y. and
Wash. Print. Tel. Co., 35 Penn. St. 298. But the contrary -'iewhasbeenheld
in some states and in the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground
that such stipulation is reasonable and obligatory. Bearsley v. W~estern
Union Tel. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 18x; Dougherty v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
54 Ark. 221; Primrose v. Western Union Telegrafih Co., 1s4 U. S. I.
CONTRACT-SUBROGATION-REFORMATION-ACCOUNT BOOKs-FAI.srncATIoN
BY CASHIER-STATE BANK OF PIKE V. NAFUR rT Al., 6r N. Y. Sup. 779.-Plain-
tiff purchased assets of a firm and contracted to pay all of defendant's obliga-
tions, "as shown by the books of said firm." Five years later they discovered
that cashier had falsified a particular book, on which they had based their
previous calculation, and that they had paid out more than they supposed
themselves liable to pay. Held, That where the defendants had made no
fraudulent representations and there was no mistake by either party as to the
terms of the contract, they could not recover the money in equity.
The plaintiff's contention forrelief under the equitable doctrine of subroga-
tion on the ground of mistake of fact, can not be allowed in the case at bar
because the plaintiff "had the means of correct information within his power,
but negligently omitted to avail himself of them." 24 Am. and Eng Ency. of
Law 284. The books were all in the hands of the plaintiff and an examination
of them would have disclosed the error, as only one had been falsified. Story
on Equity discusses this matter, § io5. That equity will not reform a contract
for a mistake of law is well established, but it will grant a reformation if there
is a mutual mistake of fact. However, in the case under consideration the
mistake was unilateral, nor was this by reason of any fraudulent representa-
tions on the part of the defendant.
DANGEROUS MACHIERY-WARNING EmPLOyEs-PRIoR ACCIDENrrs-WYWAX
V. ORR ET AL, 62 N. Y. Supp. z95.-Plaintiff, a boy of 1S, was employed in a
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paper mill to remove broken paper from sets of rollers. Electricity generated
attracted the paper so strongly that it was drawn in between the rollers and
his arms were crushed. In the trial plaintiff endeavored to introduce ev-idence
of similar prior accidents in the same place, but it was excluded. As this was an
appeal from judgment on direction of a verdict,the court considered the appellant
entitled to most favorable inferences from evidence given and also from evi-
dence erroneously excluded. Held, That it could not be said as matter of law
that the accident was caused by an obvious danger, the risk of which the
employe assumed. Kellogg. J., dissented.
To the general rule that a servant assumes the ordinary risks of his
employment, and even the risks from unsafe machinery which are apparent
and obvious, we find the exception that the masteris liable if he exposes persons
to perils which they, by reason of youth, do not comprehend. Coombs v. New
Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall.
553, 14 A. &' .E Enc. 892; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Welch, 52IlL 183;Mfalone
v. Hawley, 46 Cal. 408.
DEEDS-MORTGAGES-WARRANTY-HoPPER V. SMYSxR-SHYsER V. HOPPER,
45 Atlan. 2o6.-The habendum clause in a deed of conveyance declared the
property subject to a mortgage, but in the warranty immediately following the
mortgage was not expressly excepted. Held, that the failure to except in the
warranty did not make the grantor liable for the mortgage, because the haben-
dum clause limits the estate and interest which is described as conveyed, and
the covenant of warranty could not enlarge an estate and interest thus limited.
The contrary view is held in some States, although an outstanding mort-
gage is not a breach of the covenant of warranty, yet the covenant is an under-
taking that the covenantee shall at all times enjoy the land free from all such
encumbrances existing at the time of the grant. 8 A. &- E. Encycl. of L., 2d ed.
97. King v. Kilbride, 58 Conn. log, and cases cited.
DiVORCE-ADULTERY-CO.DONATiON-GEOGER V. GEoGrR, 45 Atlan. 349
(N. J.).-In divorce proceedings against a woman for adultery, where she proved
forgiveness by words on the part of her husband, and also his promise to receive
her back into his home and convey property to her; this was held by the court
to be an insufficient condonation of her offense by the husband.
This decision is contrary to the rule in Shackelton v. Shackelton, 48 N. J.
Eq. 364, which held ' that forgiveness may be expressed in words, and pos-
sibly by conduct without words, to show that the injured party meant to blot
out the whole past."
The court based its decisioit upon Teats v. Teats, x S. W. and Tr• 334,
which held that "words, however strong, can at the highest be regarded only
as an imperfect forgiveness, and must remain incomplete, unless followed by a
reconciliation."
Condonation requires reunion and reconciliation; a restoration of the
offender to all the marital rights. 9 A. and E. Ency. Law, 222. The husband
in this case showed only an inclination to condone the offense.
DIVORCE-ADULTERY-CUSTODY OF CHILDREN-OsTERHOUDT V. OSERuHOUDT,
62 N. Y., Sup. 529.-Held, that the court will not disturb a decree granting
the custody of children to the wife from whom the plaintiff had obtained
a divorce, on the ground that she had procured the divorce in a foreign juris-
diction and remarried, where no other misconduct is shown, and she has a
comfortable home and the children are attached to her,
The New York court will not recognize the defendant's North Dakota
divorce, and views her subsequent marriage as adultery. But it leaves her the
custody of the chidren on the round that her only misconduct depended on
the legal question of the jurisdiction of the North Dakota courts in granting
her a divorce, and that she was the better fitted for their custody. Barrett and
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Van Brunt dissenting on the ground that this is a momentous departure from
precedent to give custody of children to the guilty party; that her divorce
being not only void from want of jurisdiction, but inherently fraudulent; and
that her home is thus not a proper place for the children. The dissenting
opinion agrees with MfcGown v. McGown, ig N. Y. App. Div. 368, the facts
of which are the same. Generally, a mother, guilty of adultery, is not a fit
custodian for her children (see cases cited, Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed.,
9-689).The custody of children is given to the mother who has been guilty of
adultery in Com. v. Addicks and wffe, 5 Binn (Pa.) 52o, and Haskeltv. Has-
hell, 152 Mass. 26.
ENTRAPMENT-PUBLIc POLICY-WALTON v. CITY OF CANON CITY, 59
Pac. Rep. 841 (Colo.).-Held, where a city marshal instigated a third party to
procure the violation of a liquor law, public policy would not permit the col-
lection of the penalty. The marshal's duty was to discover such violation.
Butwhere a detective, without orders from the prosecuting attorney,procures
a similar violation, it was held to be no defense. Peofile v. Curtis, 54 N. W.
Rep. 767 (Mich.).
ESTATES-DEvISE UPON CONDITION-VALIDITY-WRIGHT ET AL. V. MAYER,
62 N. Y. Sup. 610.-Plaintiff, while living separate from her husband, took land
under a devise Which provided that, if they should resume their marital rela-
tions, the estate so devised should cease and become vested in the testator's
executors in trust to pay the income to the wife for life, and on her death to
pay the principal to her children. Held, that the condition was valid.
This condition is considered valid by a divided court, on the authority of
Cooper v. Remsen, 5 Johns Ch. 459. This seems to be correct, for while it is
well settled that conditions annexed to a gift, the tendency of which is to
induce husband and wife to separate or be divorced, are held void on the
ground of public policy, even Wld/on v. Snyder, 54 Hun. 552, which is here
quoted against the validity of the condition, says "a provision for destitute
wife might be humane" and valid.
HABEAS CORPUs-PRsONER HELD BY ExTRADITION WA-RANT-FuGITIVE
FROM JUSTICE-IN RE TOD, 8I N. W. 637 (S. D.).--Application for a writ of
habeas corpus, the petitioner being held under an extradition warrant. On
the hearing it was clearly shown, that the prisoner had come to South Dakota
from Nebraska at the request of the party he had defrauded, that proceedings
were instituted against him in Nebraska by the injured party, in pursuance of
which the petitioner was held under an extradition warrant. Held, that the
petitioner was not a fugitive from justice, and that he should be discharged
from custody.
The motives that induce the withdrawal from the State are immaterial,
where a person who has committed a crime departs without awaiting its results.
(In re Whitle, 55 Fed. Rep. 54; State v. Richter, 37 Minn. 436). But the mere
fact that the accused left the State is not enough of itself to make him a fugi-
tive from justice. All the circumstances in relation to the commission of the
offense, the time and manner of leaving the State, should be inquired into.
(Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law (new ed.), Vol. 12, p. 6o2; Opinion of Gover-
nor Fairfield in case of Certain FupitMes (Me.), Sfiearon Extradition (3d ed.)
381; Opinion of Governor Collum m Goffgan and Merrick's case, Spear on
Extradition (3d ed.) 385, 713.
HUsBAND AND Wu-AcrIoN FOR ALMNATWG HusBANrD's AFFECTION-
CRocER v. CROCER, 96 Fed. 702.-Action by a wife for the alienation of her
husband's affection. No charge was made in the declaration of criminal con-
versation. Held, that a wife canpot, under the laws of Massachusetts, main-
tain an action against a third person for merely alienating the affection of
her husband.
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This decision seems to be based on the principle that the inferior has no
right in the superior, and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury.
3 l. Comm. 143. The common law gave to the wife no action for alienation
of her husband's affection. Duffies v. Duffes, 76 Wis. 374; Doe v. Roe, 82
Me. 503. In some jurisdictions, however, the courts recognize that a wife has
a right to her husband's society and affection, and, therefore, in a case like the
present, a right of action. Foot v. Card, 58 Conn., z. T8 Atl. 1027: Warren
v. Warren, 89 Mich. 123; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. of L. Cas. 589. Lord Camp-
bell said that the wife might have action for the loss of the consortium of her
husband. Statutes in this country have so modified the law that where a
married woman may sue by herself forpersonal injuries, she can sue for loss of
consortium of her husband. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584; Bassett v.
Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 543; Clark v. Harlan, i Cin. Rep. 418; Leaver v.
Adams, 19 At. 776; Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621; Afekekoff v.
Mehehaff, 26 Fed. -Rep. 13.
INSURANCE-CHANGE OF TITLE-NOTICE-WHITNEY V. AMERICMN L'suR-
ANCE Co. xT AL., 59 Pac. 897 (Col.).-Action brought by the mortgagee to
recover the amount of an insurance policy. A mortgage clause in the policy
provided "that the mortgagee or trustee shall notify this company of any
change of 6wnership * * * which shall come to his knowledge." One B
holding a general power of attorney for C, requested S, the owner of the insured
property to make a deed of the property to C, which he did, and B had the
deed recorded. Before C had accepted the conveyance, the building on the
premises was destroyed by fire, whereupon he refused to accept. B imme-
diately reconveyed the property to S. Held, that there was no change of
ownership in the property which necessitated notice to the insurer.
The question in this case was whether the handing of the deed to B con-
stituted a delivery. The test of delivery is: Did the grantor by his acts or
words intend to divest himself of the title ? If so, the deed is delivered.
Austin v. Tendall, 2 M. S., Arthur, D. C. 362. Generally speaking the
delivery of a deed to an agent appointed by the vendee therein to receive it is
a delivery to such vendee. Soward v. Moss, 78 N. W. 373 (Neb.). In the
case under review the court seems not to have regarded B as an agent of C,
although he held a general power of attorney from him. Temple, J.,
dissenting.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-PRIZES -IN R E PUGNET HABA.A, THE SOLA,
20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 29o.-Held, vessels flying the enemy's flag engaged in coast
fisheries, but carrying no arms, are not subject to capture. See Comment.
INTERSTATE COMMEEc-STATE LAWS AFmc ,-LcEmSE TAx IMeoSzD
BY CITY.-PABST BREWING CO. V. CITY OF TERRE HAuTz ET AL. 98 Fed. Rep.
33.-The common council of Terre Haute, under authority of the Legislature,
passed an ordinance imposing a license tax of $i,ooo annually upon every
person, corporation or firm maintaining a brewery, depot or agency within the
limits of said city. The complainant maintained a depot in the city for
storing its goods until they could be delivered, but had in the State of Indiana
no brewery or place of manufacture for its goods. The complainant sought
an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance chiefly on the
ground that it is in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Held, that such a license tax is invalid, being a tax on interstate commerce,
and not an exercise of the police powers of the state within the terms of the
Wilson Act (26 Stat. C. 728).
The question is here considered as to the right of a state or city to tax the
product of another state coming into it. The Supreme Court has decided that
a state may impose a license fee upon intoxicating liquors, brought in from
another state, when this license is for the purpose of xegulatng an controlling
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the importation and sale, without violating the Constitution. Hinson v. Lott,
8 Wall U. S. 148; License Cases, 5 How U. S. S4. A license is for the pur-
pose of control, supervision, or regulation of some act or thing, and not for
revenue, for in such a case it is a tax. Ash v. People, xI Mich. 347. In re Wan
Yin, 22 Fed. Rep. 7xo. In the present case there was no evidence in the
record that any provisions were made for the supervisijon, control, or regulation
of such breweries, depots, or agencies. Therefore this assessment was a tax
for revenue, outside the police powers of the state, and contrary to the inter-
state commerce clause of the constitution.
J UDGMENT AGAINST DEcEDENT-IMPEAcnMENT-ACTION BY HEIR-KAYES
T AL. v. Vic IR ET AL., 59 Pac. 628 (Kan.). Held, that at common law a
judgment against a dead person is absolutely void and may be collaterally
impeached by the heirs. Nor does it make any difference that service may
have been obtained or the suit commenced before the death of the defendant.
There seems to be a wide diversity of opinion by the courts on this question.
In the greater number of cases the rule appears to be that a judgment of the
court rendered when one of the original parties was dead is voidable only, and
can not be collaterally impeached, Knott v. aylor. 99 N. Car. u. In the
case under discussion, the court confesses that its judgment was rendered upon
what appeared to be the reason and principle of the question and less upon
the authority of the adjudged cases." There is, however, no lack of authority
for this view, since in a number of states it has been held that a judgment
against a decedent is absolutely void. Life Association v. Fassett, 120111. 315.
LARcFY-GREEN GOODS-PEOPLE V. LMvINGSTONE, 62 N. Y. Supp. 9.-
Prosecutor gave $5oo, with the expectation of receiving $3,000 counterfeit
money. Held, if prosecutor parts with his property for an unlawful purpose,
no prosecution for false pretenses can be sustained. McCord v. Peofile, 46
N. Y. 470.
The court regrets that the defendant must be given a new trial and sug-
vests that the Legislature alter the rule in McCord v..Peofle, supra. There
is a provision in the Penal Code for the punishment of "green goods"
offenders, but prosecution under it is difficult owing to its technicalities.
LIFE INSURANCE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF STATUTE AFFECT-
ING BUSINESS OF LIFE INSDRC-E-MRCHANTS' LIFE Ass'N V. YOAKUM, 98
Fed. 25i.-A statute in Texas allows a policy holder in a life insurance 
com-
pany to recover the amount of his policy and 12% interest theron, if the policy
be not paid by the company within specified time after demand made. Held,
this statute is valid and not in violation of the i4th Amendment.
The purpose of this statute is not to compel Life Insurance Companies to
pay their debts, but to secure a proper degree of care on their part in writing
policies. That the enactment of such a statute is but the valid exercise of the
legislative power seems most reasonable. Foreign Insurance Companies, as
between insurer and insured, are by far the stronger, and this statute is mani-
festly for the protection of the weaker. It is not an arbitrary classification,
nor is it discriminative, but, in its application to all such companies, seeks only
to subserve the public interests. Railway Co. v. Matthews, z65 U. S. x ;
Casualty Co. v. Allione, go Tex. 660, 40 S. W. 339, decide the validity of
similar statutes and are in accord with the present decision.
MALICiOUS PROSEcuTIoN-DAMAGs-PLADNG-EVIDENCE-EvINS v. MET-
AOPOLUTAN ST. Ry. Co., 62 N. Y. Sup. 495.-In an action for malicious prosecu-
tion and false imprisonment the complainant failed to allege any special dam-
ages to his business as a lawyer. Held, that it was error to admit evidence of
the plaintiff's loss of business subsequent to the arrest. Goodrich, P. J., dis-
sented.
Some courts hold that allegation of special damage must be made in the
pleadings, especially where the earning power is extraordinary. Baldwin v.
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Western R. Corfi., 4 Gray (Mass.) 333; Joslin v. Grand Rafids Ice Co., 50
Mich. 516. But it is also held that the loss of earnings and business engage-
ments is the necessary result of personal injuries and need not be specially
pleaded. Luck v. Rifion, 52 Wis. 200; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y. 264.
MARINE INSURANCE-INSURANCE ON PROFITS ON CARGO-TOTAL Loss-
ABANDONMENT-PORTION SAVED DELIVERED TO OWNERS AS PART PAYMENT-
CANADA SUGAR REF. CO. V. INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA, 20 Sup. Court
Rep. 239.-Petitioners insured the profits on a cargo of sugar, against total
loss only, in the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., and shortly afterwards took
out another policy in the Insurance Co. of N. A., which is the respondentin this
suit. The ship while on her voyage stranded and was abandoned to the
Atlantic Co., which succeeded in saving about 300 tons of the sugar, which
they sent to Montreal and turned over to the Sugar Company as part payment
of their total loss policy. The other Company refused to pay, on the ground
that there was not a total loss of goods. Held, a recovery of insurance on
profits of a cargo under a policy insuring against total loss only, and valuing
the profits at the sum insured, will not be prevented where the cargo was
abandoned as a total loss, by the fact that other insurers of the cargo subse-
quently saved a portion of it, and then delivered it to the former owners in part
payment, on a settlement of their liability for the total loss of the cargo.
There seems to be some doubt if the words "total loss only" will preclude
the insured from recovering where there is simply a constructive total loss.
Parsons considers it doubtful (2 Parsons on Contracts .8), Thomson v. Royal
F rchange Ass. Co. 16 East 219. and contra, Hubner v.Ea le Insurance Co.,
io Grey 131. This court, however, holds that there was a total loss as to the
owners, since they had abandoned the cargo to one of the underwriters. No
formal notice of abandonment was necessary, since, "Actual abandonment
dispenses with formal notice."
MARRIED WoME's AcT-CoVERTURE-STATUTE OF LIrITATIONS---BLIL.ER V.
BoswELL, 59 Pac. Rep. 798 (Wyo.).-Held, upon reason and authority a
statute permitting afeme covert to sue and be sued alone, does not by impli-
cation do away with disability of coverture that excepts her from the statute
of limitations.
The weight of authority inclines the other way. The English rule as to
her separate estate, even before the Married Women's Property Act, was that
the disability was removed; and undoubtedly thereafter. In re Lady Hast-
ings, 35 Chan. Div. 94; Lowe v. Fox, 5 Q. B. Div. 667. Such is the New York
rule. Clark v. Gibbons, 83 N. Y o7. Contra, Miss., Ohio, North Carolina,
and Texas. The reasdn of the disability, it is conceived, ceases when the
feme covert is allowed to act as afeme sole.
NEGLIGENcE-DEFzcrrvE CoNsTRUCTIoN-OWNER's LiABUrrY-BURmE v.
IRELAND, 62 N. Y. Supp. 453.-Where the defendant hired an architect to
draw plans for a building which were inherently defective, held, he cannot
evade the liability for injury to a contractor's employe caused by its collapse,
as the duty of securing a solid foundation for the building rested on the
defendant, though the contractor was negligent in laying the foundation.
Vogel v. Mayor, 92 N. Y. Io.
Goodrich, P. J., dissented on the ground that the failure of an architect
to prepare sufficient plans cannot be imputed to his principal, unless the rela-
tion of master and servant or principal and agent exists. Berg v. Parsons,
156 N. Y. iog.
PATENTS-ANTIgIPATION-PRIoR KNOWLEDGE AND UsE.-WELSBACH LIGHT
Co. v. AMERICAN INCANDESCENT LAmP Co. xT AL., 98 Fed. 613. Held, one
applying for a patent in the U. S. for an invention .previons.y made by him
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and patented in a foreign country, may show actual date of his application in
such country to prove the actual date of the invention, so as to avoid an
alleged use in this country by an infringer before the date of the foreign
patent.
This decision is in conformity with that of Judge Townsend in Hani/en
v. Price, 96 Fed. 435, and that of Judge Dallas in Hanifen v. Godshalk, 78
Fed. 81I. In Hanfen v. Price, this point was considered as new and the
present case is the first affirmation -we have seen of the principles in that case.
See 9 YALE LAW JOURNAL 101.
SALES-CONTRACT-INsuRANCE-OPTION To RESELL-TITLE.-STOWELL ET
AL. V. CLARK ET AL., 62 N. Y. Sup. I55.-Action on a policy of insurance, condi-
tioned to be void if the interest of the insured in the property was other than
sole and unconditional. Plaintiffs had purchased the machinery covered by
such policy, with an option after a certain time to return it, and receive back
the money paid or to pay the balance and keep it. Held, that plaintiffs were
entitled to collect the insurance on the property destroyed, as under the con-
tract they took an absolute title.
A purchase with right of return passes title and risk immediately to the
vendee, and leaves the vendor obliged to rebuy at the vendee's option; this is
the prevailing American rule. Martin v. Adams, IO4 Mass. 262; McKinney
v. Bradlee, 117 Mass. 321. But some cases hold that such a conditional sale
is only a bailment till the time limit has expired. This is the English rule
and conflicts with American rule generally. Elfdch v. Barnes, 5 C. P. D.
321; Carter v. Wallace, 35 Hunn (N. Y.) i89.
SALE OF HORE-WA RANTY-BREAcH-DAMAGES-BRucE v. Fiss, DoERR
& CARROLL HORSE Co., 62 N. Y. Supp. 96.-A horse was bought under a false
warranty that he was a good carriage horse. Held, that the purchaser can
recover damages for an injury caused by an attempt to use it for that particu-
lar purpose. Randall v. Newson, 2 Q. B. Div. 1o2; johes v. George, 61
Tex. 345.
Contrary to this well established rule, Schurmeier v. English, 46 Minn.
3o6, held that the purchaser of a warranted wagon could not recover for dam-
ages done to a horse drawing it.
SET-OFF-CLAIMS PURCHASED BY DEFENDANT AFTER SUIT BROUGHT-WELLS
v. Ov.RBY, 54 S. W. 955 (Ky.).-Held, that claims against plaintiff purchased
after suit brought are a proper subject of set-off.
This decision is contrary to the great weight of authority, the general
rule being that a claim is not a proper subject of set-off unless it existed in
favor of the defendant at the time action is brought. 22 Am. Eng. rEnc. of
Law 274.
SHIPPING--DAmAGzS To CARGo-SEAwoRTHINmSS-FARR & BAILEY MFG.
Co. v. INTERNATIONAL NAy. Co., 98 Fed. 636.-A ship started on a voyage
with one porthole insecurely fastened, which became open so that water entered
and damaged cargo. Held, she was unseaworthy, because not in a fit condi-
tion. Gray, J., dissents.
This case was distinguished from The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462, where the iron
ports being left open purposely to admit light, the glass ports were broken
and damage done by water entering. Damage was here held to be due to
fault in management, from which the owners of a ship are exempt, by the
Harter Act, exempting the owners from any damage resulting from any fault
or error in the navigation or in the management of the vessel.
This seems a very close distinction and one not entirely warranted by the
authorities. We are inclined to follow. the view of Judge Gray, who, in his
dissenting opinion, cites the case of Hedley v. Steamshifi Co. i894, Afif. Cases
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222, and upholds the case of The Silvia. It would certainly seem to be stretch-
ing the meaning of unseaworthiniss to say that a vessel is unseaworthy
because of a porthole insecurely fastened.
STREET RAILWAY-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-APPoRTIONMENT OF FAULT
-ANDERsoN V. METROPOLITAN Co., 61 N. Y., Sup. 8g.-Plaintiff, while riding
on a wagon that was approaching at right angles a street railway, saw a car
approaching about thirty feet distant. The driver did not stop or alter his
course and the wagon was struck by the car. Held, plaintiff could not recover
damages, as he was not free from fault.
The present case is distinguishable from the rule laid down in Gilbert
v. Erie R. Co., 97 Fed. 747, 9 YALE LAW JOURNAL 234, that where plaintiff
and defendant are concurrently negligent the defendant is liable if the exercise
of reasonable care on his part would have avoided plaintiffs injury. To have
this rule, which seems to be well established in the United States courts, apply,
gross negligence on the part of defendant is contemplated and only slight
-negligence on the part of the plaintiff, a state of facts which does not exist in
the present case. Here the negligence seems to be not only concurrent, but of
equal degree.
STREET RAILWAYs-PEcuIAR OPEEATION-NEGLIGENCE PEP SE-CITIZENS'
ST. Ry. Co. v. HOFFBAUER, 56 A. E. 54 (Ind.).-Defendant operated an open
electric car, entered from one side by a foot-board running the length of
the car. The car at a certain point was run on the left instead of on the right
hand double track, with the foot-board but a few inches from the trolley poles.
At dusk a passenger, ignorant of the peculiar manner of operation, was
injured by stepping on the foot-board and being hit by a trolley pole. Held,
the facts are sufficient to justify a finding of negligence, but not to constitute
a case of negligence per se.
The general tendency of modern decisions is to limit the province of the
jury by the extension of the per se doctrine in cases where negligence is clear.
Beach Contri Negf. 3rd Ed., § 453. The ruling in the present case is con-
trary to this tendency, as many much more doubtful cases have been held
within the per se rule. French v. R. R. Co., 1x6 Mass. 537; Daniels v.
Liebig Co., 42 At. 447. Riding on a foot-board is held not negligence on
part of plaintiff in Brainard v.2?. R. Co., 61 N. Y. Sup. 74, 9 YA LW JoUR-
NAL 182.
SuRvIvAL AcTs-INTANTANEous DEATH-AMouNT OF DAMAGEs-BRouGHEL
v. SourHRN NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE CoMPANY, 45 AtL Rep. 435 (Conn.).
-Under a statute providing that a decedent's cause of action, even in case of
instantaneous death, shall survive to his administrator; the damages to be
awarded are not confined to nominal damages, even though as a matter of fact,
" death was instantaneous and the decedent suffered no pain or sensation, and
never regained consciousness. See Comment.
TREATIEs-ENABLING STATUTES-RIGHTS OF ALmNs-BLi-rhE v. HiNcxLzy,
5Q Pac. Rep. 787 (Cal.).-This presented the novel question, whether a statute
giving non-resident aliens the right to hold land was unconstitutional as a
usurpation of the treaty-making power, when the treaty was silent upon this
point. Held, in absence of a contrary treaty stipulation, statute was valid,
Hanreck v. Patrick, 9ig U. S. z56; and in case of conflict was not void, but
merely suspended during the operation of the treaty. Geofry v. Rggs, 133
U. S. 258.
VERDicr-Nzw TRm I-MA .AcIc--EvIDENc--PHoToGA Hs--ExcEp-
TON$--JAVESON v. WELD, 45 Atlan. 299 (Me.).-Action on the case against the
defendant, a physician and surgeon, for malpractice in treating the plaintiff
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for an injury to the elbow of the right arm. An X-ray photograph was
admitted in evidence, and exception taken by counsel for defendant on the
ground that it was an exaggeration and a distortion. Held, that it was a dis-
cretion of the presiding justice to admit an X-ray photograph, and his deter-
mination thereon is not open to exceptions.
This seems to be the rule in Mass. Blair v. Pelham, riS Mass. 42o; Van
Houten v. Morse, 162 Mass. 414. In Udderzook v.. Com., 76 Pa. St. 340, it
was held that the court may take judicial cognizance of a photograph as of other
matters of science. Some authorities are more reserved. In Cunningham,
Admx., v. Fair Haven &- Wesiville R. R. Co., 72 Conn. 244, the court said,
"We do not see how this preliminary question differs from any other, where
questions of fact and law may be intermingled-the conclusions of the trial
judge may be so clearly against law that we can to a certain extent review
them." Geer v. Missouri L. &- M. Co., z34 Mo. 85 ; McLean v. Scribbs, 52
Mich. 219.
WiLLs-EVIDENCE OF EXISTECFc-IN RE CAMEON'S EsTATE, 62 N. Y. Sup.
187.-Held, that photographs of a lost will and codicil are admissible in evi-
dence to prove its existence and defeat proceedings to obtain letters of
administration.
Photographs of places are frequently given to juries, where the jury can-
not view the places. But such photographs are subject to attack as being in-
accurate. Dyson v. N. Y. and New England R. R.' 57 Conn. 7; Cunning-
ham v. Fair Haven and Westville, 72 Conn., 244. Photographs of docu-
ments, if properly authenticated, are sometimes admitted where better evi-
dence cannot be obtained. In re Stefhens, L. R. 9 C. P. 187.
